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        Abstract  
While public goods can provide an overall increase in welfare, ‘inferior’ public facilities 
produce externalities specifically impacting host locations. Heterogeneous jurisdictional 
attributes, however, can cause net social benefits to vary across potential host communities. 
Using data from a unique public works project, this paper empirically investigates whether 
policymakers consider heterogeneous conditions when locating prison facilities. Results 
indicate that policymakers follow a process that maximizes net social benefits by 
systematically delegating such facilities to lagging communities; thereby potentially using the 
public facilities for economic development. Additionally, results suggest that policymakers 
properly consider existing infrastructure and agglomeration economies in the siting 
mechanism.
Todd L. Cherry & Mitch Kunce (2001) "Do Policymakers Locate Prisons for Economic 
Development" Growth and Change   Volume 32 Issue 4 pp. 533-547 Version of Record Available 
From (www.researchgate.net)
Introduction
he siting of a public facility commonly entails external impacts on the host
community far beyond those generated for society.  In most cases,
facilities such as public parks and universities yield positive externalities to the
local neighborhood.  Some public operations, however, generate an adverse
impact on the immediate area that may lead to negative net benefits for the host
communities. Examples of such inferior public facilities include hazardous
waste storage, sewage treatment, and correctional facilities.
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 The local net
benefits provided by such a facility to the host neighborhood largely depends on
the relative economic impact—which depends heavily on current local
economic conditions and opportunities (Schichor 1992). As such, policymakers
that efficiently locate an inferior public facility should consider the
heterogeneous economic conditions of potential host sites.
While in many cases this entails minimizing the negative net benefits, locating
a prison facility, with its substantial workforce, budgets and vendor support, can
provide significant positive gains to many lagging communities.2 Thus, the
efficient prison siting decision,  in essence, can be an active development policy
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when the positive economic impact dominates the negative externalities for the
host location.  But do policymakers potentially use prison facilities for economic
development?  At the local level, policymakers and residents from potential host
communities often exhibit such behavior when prosperous communities shun
the possibility of having prisons “in their back yard” while lagging communities
welcome and even compete for the ‘privilege’ of housing such facilities (Silas
1984). The motivation behind the ultimate location decision by central
policymakers is less transparent. Efficient prison siting suggests the decision
should follow a process that accounts for the spatial heterogeneity of economic
conditions, as well as construction and operating costs.  The current state of the
criminology and sociology literature offers little substantive information on this
conjecture (McShane et al. 1992), and no corresponding efforts exist within
economics.3  Indeed, methodological rigor is obstructed by the limited provision
of inferior public facilities. California’s unprecedented prison expansion,
however, provides a unique opportunity empirically to examine the location
pattern of such facilities.
Using prison siting decisions at the county level for the State of California
between 1982 and 1994, the conjecture that policymakers follow a process that
considers the heterogeneous economic conditions of potential host communities;
thereby using prisons for economic development, was examined.  Results from
the conditional logit analysis reveal that a county’s likelihood of hosting a prison
is significantly greater in economically lagging communities where the
economic benefits may overcome the negative externalities of hosting the
facility. Policymakers consequently appear to use prisons as a form of economic
development. The proposition that policymakers act rationally is further
supported by evidence that existing infrastructure and agglomeration economies
increase the likelihood of a potential site hosting a new prison facility.
The remainder of this paper is divided into four sections. The first provides a
brief background on the U.S. prison condition, specifically California’s
experience. Next the unique data set is introduced and the model used to
produce empirical estimates of prison location determinants is described. Then
the empirical results and implications are presented before concluding with final
remarks.
Background on Prisons and California’s Location Process
Given that public good facilities are generally provided in small numbers, an
empirical investigation of the location decisions for such facilities can be
problematic.  But recent trends in the criminal justice system open a door of
opportunity to perform a conditional analysis on one particular type of inferior
public facility—prisons. Beginning in the 1980s, the United States and most
other western nations adopted a policy of greater incarceration involving longer
sentence lengths and incarcerating for more offenses. This current policy,
irresistible to policymakers, promises that by dramatically increasing the
incarceration rate, society will reap a “virtual windfall of benefits” (Romero
1994).  Consequently, the United States has experienced a 220 percent increase
in the incarceration rate since 1980 with the total United States prison and jail
population exceeding 1.8 million (Beck and Mumola 1999).  For the past
decade, the number of inmates has grown at an average annual rate of 7 percent.
In concrete numbers, this rate of growth equated to over 1,200 new inmates per
week in 1998.  The current United States prison population exceeds every
industrialized nation in absolute terms and is second only to Russia when
accounting for population (Mauer 1997).
As a consequence of the rapid growth in incarceration rates, the need for
facilities to house the ever-growing inmate populations has increased
substantially.  Nowhere is this more evident than in California where the state
has constructed what is now the largest prison complex in the western
industrialized world.  California currently houses more inmates (over 161,000 in
1998) than does France, Germany, and Japan combined.  Beginning in 1981, the
California Department of Corrections (CDC) undertook an immense prison
building program where 22 new prisons were constructed at a cost in excess of
$5.3 billion.4 As with any public good provision, an inherent decision in the
process was determining the location of each prison facility.  Such a decision is
far from trivial, in fact, the selection generally involves spirited debate among
potential communities.  Motivated by average annual budgets of $70.2 million
and average employment numbers of 1078 (CDC), some jurisdictions welcome
the economic enrichment provided by prison facilities—analogous to the
addition of private commerce.  From a depressed area’s viewpoint, prisons are
labor-intensive, non-polluting institutions and can provide a stable economic
anchor to the local economy. For example, jurisdictions in the State of Nebraska
participated in an “anxiety-filled” competition for the state’s single largest
construction project in history, a new state prison (Omaha World-Herald, March
10 1998).  The stakes and costs were high—many jurisdictions expended up to
$60,000 in the application process, in which each host candidate was required to
donate the land along with the costs of road construction and public utility
hookups.  Six finalists were selected in March of 1998 with the facility finally
being awarded to the town of Tecumseh in the rural southeastern part of the
state.
In California’s case, the CDC has historically developed a periodic core
facility plan that molds the legislative proposals for construction of new
facilities. This comprehensive facility plan initiates with inmate population
projections. Population needs are estimated twice a year using a count and
security level projection algorithm. The process leading to a decision is dynamic
and involves communication between state and local officials. However, the
final authorization of when to build, and where, rests with the state legislature.
The Methodology
Prison authorization dates were gathered from the CDC over the 1982-94
interval. Twenty-two facilities were started, completed and opened within this
time frame. Table 1 presents the authorization date, host county and operation
information for each new facility during the 1982-94 period.  The figures reflect
the potential economic impact with each facility involving substantial
employment levels and annual operating budgets. As the table illustrates, a
pleasant feature of the data is the similarity of the facilities (capacity, employees
and budget).
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 The county where a prison is constructed constitutes the location
choice (the dependent variable) in this analysis.  Simply, the state legislature and
CDC have 58 counties from which to choose within the state to locate a facility.
Attributes of each California county were collected for the years 1982, 1986,
and 1990.  The data is subdivided into the 3 time intervals to proxy the current
‘condition’ under which the location decision is made.  It is assumed that the
characteristics of a county, for example in 1982, sway the location pattern of
prisons in the four years post.  The four-year time span arises as a judicious
option when one considers that authorization and construction processes follow
variable time spans ranging from two to six years.  The importance of this four-
year interval, however, is tempered by the modest within-county (time) variation
of the county characteristics.
6
 As one would expect, the between-county
variation will provide the underlying incentives behind any targeting of
economic development.  From 1982 to 1985 nine facilities were authorized,
eight from 1986 to 1989, and five from 1990 to 1994.
7
 A detailed discussion of
county characteristic variables is deferred to the fourth section.
The empirical model examines how the location of a prison is influenced by
a county’s general economic condition.  In deciding on a new prison’s location,
state policymakers will presumably consider how conditions, and therefore
potential net benefits, vary over county choices.  This reduced form construct
does not contradict the reality that siting decisions are the result of a dynamic
process between potential host communities and the state. Indeed, state
policymakers in part (if not entirely) consider local conditions through the
communication with local officials, but the ultimate decision remains with the
central policymakers.  Whether the central policymaker acts directly on the local
conditions or acts on expressed opinions based on the local conditions, the
analysis of the siting decision remains the same.
Conditional on the fact that building a facility has been authorized, the
probability of it being constructed in a particular county depends on the area’s
relative condition.  The conditional logit model developed by McFadden (1974)
TABLE 1. PRISON CONSTRUCTION AND OPERATING INFORMATION*
Date Host Population / Total Operating
Prison Authorized County Capacity Employment Budget
Avenal 1983 Kings 5,722 / 2,320 1463 $92.4mil
Calipatria 1988 Imperial 4,071 / 2,208 1143 70.0
Central Women’s 1987 Madera 3,639 / 2,004 956 63.3
Centinela 1989 Imperial 4,598 / 2,208 1085 77.3
Corcoran 1985 Kings 4,703 / 3,016 1723 117.5
Chuckawalla 1985 Riverside 3,592 / 1,738 898 60.0
High Desert 1990 Lassen 4,273 / 2,224 1223 90.0
Ironwood 1990 Riverside 4,629 / 2,200 1096 83.3
LA County 1987 LA 4,207 / 2,200 1139 88.0
Mule Creek 1983 Amador 3,565 / 1,700 888 69.0
Northern Women’s 1984 San Joaquin 772 / 400 257 19.5
North Kern 1988 Kern 5,090 / 2,692 1140 73.1
Pelican Bay 1986 Del Norte 3,296 / 2,280 1317 83.8
Pleasant Valley 1989 Fresno 4,683 / 2,208 1250 79.0
R.J. Donovan 1982 San Diego 4,290 / 2,200 1053 78.0
Sacramento 1982 Sacramento 2,914 / 1,728 1158 80.3
Corcoran, Sub-
stance 1993 Kings 6,279 / 3,324 1704 101.0
Southern Max,
CCI a 1982 Kern 5,196 / 2781 1678 106.0
Solano 1983 Solano 5,829 / 2,610 1246 94.9
Salinas 1992 Monterey 4,161 / 2,224 1300 88.0
Valley State
Women’s 1990 Madera 3,618 / 1,980 937 63.0
Wasco 1988 Kern 5,967 / 2,984 1323 95.0
* Populations of June 1999; Total Employment includes custodial and service staff;
Operating Budget is annual operating budget in millions for 1999-2000. Source:
California Department of Corrections.
a Numbers include existing CCI facility.
is often used to analyze choices among discrete alternatives.  The methodology
is common within the firm location literature in which jurisdiction location
attributes (e.g., agglomeration economics and environmental regulation)
influence the location decision of firms (Bartik 1988; Levinson 1996; List and
Co. 2000).
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 It is a natural extension to employ the conditional logit model in the
examination of the location patterns of prison facilities.
To apply this construct to prison location, suppose that net benefits (overall
utility) of siting a new prison facility i in county j are a function of a vector of
observed characteristics Xj plus a disturbance term uij iid Weibull or
NBij = ’Xj + uij .                                               (1)
Following McFadden, let Yi equal the choice made (takes the value 1 if a
particular county ‘k’ is chosen, 0 otherwise) with the probability of prison i
locating in county j = k given as
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If county attributes are significant in determining the likelihood of a prison
location, then policymakers are considering the heterogeneity of those attributes
across potential sites in an effort to maximize the net social benefits of the
public facility.  As such, the location decision may be in part driven by concerns
related to these factors.
Further comments regarding the empirical specification are warranted.
Equation (2) is the foundation for the conditional logit model which is estimated
using MLE.  The model requires that the error term be independent across the
choices.  With 58 choices modeled, this restriction could be problematic.
McFadden (1978) suggests the use of location and/or regional dummy variables
to capture any correlation of unobserved characteristics and mitigate the
‘independence of irrelevant alternatives’ effect.  While the current sample
provides a unique opportunity to empirically examine the location patterns of
inferior public goods, the limited data does call for a parsimonious specification.
We therefore opt for regional dummies to account for heterogeneity across the
northern coast, southern coast, northern forests, southeast desert and central
regions.  A Wald test of joint significance of the area dummies mildly rejects the
null ( 2=7.98; p=0.087).
9
 In addition, a Hausman and McFadden (1984) test
regarding the imposition of independence of irrelevant alternatives indicates that
the presence of the problem cannot be rejected at any conventional level.  Erring
on the side of proper specification, the regional dummies in the estimated model
are retained.
Results
Conditional on the legislative authorization to open a new prison, the
likelihood of constructing the facility in a particular county depends on
characteristics of that county relative to other potential sites. Table 2 presents
the definition, source, and descriptive statistics of the variables used to proxy

relevant county attributes (Xj). The main purpose of this analysis is to determine
whether general economic conditions influence prison siting decisions. The
county’s unemployment rate provides a direct measure of real economic
opportunities within the county (i.e., magnitude of excess demand for jobs).
Income per capita was originally considered but to alleviate multicollinearity
concerns the specification used the county’s poverty rate to capture resident
wealth.
10
 Manufacturing firms per square mile proxy the level of existing
economic development (i.e., firm capital) in the county, while the education
level of county residents measures the amount of human capital. 
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Beyond economic factors, the vector of relevant attributes also controls for
other important considerations for the prison siting decision. Costs of
constructing and operating a new facility depend on existing infrastructure, land
prices, and agglomeration economies.  Existing infrastructure within a potential
county is proxied by the total road miles per square mile and the cost of land is
captured by housing values. Agglomeration economies within the prison
industry represent savings that arise by locating facilities in close proximity (i.e.,
managing, servicing, etc.). Agglomeration effects are captured by including the
number of existing prisons in a county (pre- and post- sample). Given that the
relatively thin data called for a parsimonious specification, the option selected
was to include county population to account for many general characteristics
including the county’s potential labor supply, number of votes (i.e., political
influence), and urbanization.
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The data show considerable variation across counties. For example, the
average unemployment rate in the sample is 10.90 percent, which ranges from a
low of 2.5 percent in Marin County (1990) to a high of 31.45 percent in Imperial
County (1982).  And while the sample averaged one firm per square mile, the
numbers of firms varied greatly, with San Francisco having the greatest
concentration of 31 (1990) firms per square mile and Inyo having the lowest
concentration of only 0.0028 (1990).  The poverty rate also shows substantial
variation with Marin County experiencing the low at 5.2 percent (1982) and
Imperial County facing the high at 24.5 percent (1990).  Though the data vary
greatly across jurisdictions, variation over time is relatively moderate, with most
counties maintaining their general position, lagging or prospering, within the
sample.  Nevertheless, these time effects were accounted for with the three time
intervals described above.
Given that state and local policymakers act so that net benefits are
maximized, the model predicts that the likelihood of a prison locating in a
county will be inversely related to prosperous economic conditions and land
values and be positively related to current infrastructure and the existence of
prisons.  Table 3 presents the conditional logit results and relevant summary
statistics.  Of the eight county variables, six are statistically significant at
TABLE 3. ESTIMATES OF THE DETERMINANTS ON THE PROBABILITY OF CALIFORNIA
PRISON LOCATION
Variable Coefficient, (t)
Poverty Rate 0.008 (0.09)
Mfg. Firms per Sq. Mile -4.520** (-2.09)
Unemployment Rate 0.112* (1.77)
Existing Prisons 0.860** (2.24)
Total Road Miles per
Sq. Mile of Land Area 0.844**
(2.06)
Population 0.002** (2.29)
Education Level -0.188* (-1.78)
Housing Value -0.006 (-0.31)
Southern Coast*** 0.820 (1.27)
Northern Coast*** 0.176 (0.22)
South East Desert*** -1.290 (-1.43)
Northern Forests*** -1.45 (-1.31)
Likelihood Ratio (df) 41.89 (12)
Pseudo R2 .235
N♦, 1276,
* Significant at 10%.
** Significant at 5%.
♦ 22 prisons choosing over 58 counties
*** Region joint significance, Wald test, Chi-squared 7.98, significance level .087
conventional levels with each having the expected relationship with the
likelihood of prison construction.  Existing commerce, in the form of plentiful
manufacturing facilities, decrease the predicted probabilities of locating in an
average county.  Confirming the importance of economic conditions, higher
levels of unemployment and lower levels of education increased the chance of
new prison construction.  The percentage of the population living in poverty has
the expected positive relationship with new prison construction but failed to be
significant at conventional levels. These results suggest that policymakers
follow a process that systematically delegates the prison industry to lagging
communities, which maximizes net benefits of the inferior public good facility.
Moreover, given previous evidence of local support, the prison industry appears
to be an active source of economic development.
Results indicate that the decision process also considers costs associated with
infrastructure, land values and agglomeration effects. Estimates indicate
available infrastructure, proxied by road miles per square mile of land,
significantly raises the likelihood of a new correctional facility.  Existing prison
facilities also carries a significant positive relationship, which indicates that
policymakers exploit agglomeration economies within the operation of prison
facilities.  The raw data supports the agglomeration result by revealing that
policymakers located two facilities in a single city on seven occasions.13 Though
not significant, the estimated inverse relationship between prison location and
housing values does correspond with cost considerations. The significant
relationship between county population and new prison construction succeeds in
controlling for other factors such as the potential labor supply, political
influence and urbanization.
While the results presented in Table 3 provide valuable insights regarding
significant relationships, the estimated coefficients from this probability model
are not directly marginal effects because every attribute in Xj affects all the
probabilities of a county location.  As such, elasticities are calculated to further
aid in the interpretation.  County choice elasticities of the probabilities would
take the form,
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where k is the county choice, m is the specific attribute and P represents the
relevant probabilities.  Table 4 presents the high, median, low, and sample
average of county-specific elasticities for each of the statistically significant
underlying attribute variables evaluated at variable sample means.  The values
depicted in Table 4 represent the percentage effect on the probability of locating
in county j by increasing the level of the characteristic variable by one percent.
For example, using the county averages at the bottom of Table 4, a one-percent
increase in the population of an average California county will increase the
probability of a prison locating there by 1.103 percent, ceteris paribus.
The elasicities provide additional evidence that the economic environment
plays a large role in the location of prison facilities.  Existing commerce, as
measured by firms per square mile, has a relatively large impact on the
likelihood of a jurisdiction being selected for new prison construction.
Interpreting the effects, it can be seen that a 5 percent increase in the number of
firms per square mile will lower the chance of a new facility within the average
county by 10.7 percent.  Unemployment also has a sizable impact on the
location of prison facilities where a one-percent increase in the level of
unemployment in the average California county will increase the probability of a
prison locating there by 1.312 percent.  As such, an increase of approximately
one standard deviation of 5 percentage points in the sample average
unemployment rate (10.90%) will raise the likelihood of prison construction by
6.5 percent. Education level exhibits the largest impact on a county’s chance of
being selected for a new prison facility where increasing the percentage of
citizens that hold a college degree by 5 percent retards the likelihood of a prison
locating there by 17.1 percent.  Estimated marginal effects indicate that existing
prison facilities is not a primary criterion in prison location decisions even
though evidence exists that some agglomeration effects are present within the
prison industry.
TABLE 4. INTERPRETING THE COEFFICIENTS OF TABLE 3 WITH ELASTICITIES. TABLE VALUES
REPRESENT THE PERCENTAGE CHANGE IN THE PROBABILITY OF LOCATING IN A COUNTY
DUE TO A ONE PERCENT INCREASE IN A SIGNIFICANT COUNTY CHARACTERISTIC
(EVALUATED AT VARIABLE SAMPLE MEANS; COUNTY POSSESSING THE HIGH, MEDIAN OR
LOW ELASTICITY IS PROVIDED IN PARENTHESES).
Firmsa Unemploy Existing Roadsd Populatione Educationf
mentb Prisonsc
High -26.831 3.122 2.022 15.690 18.431 -8.114
(Orange) (Sierra) (Riverside) (San Fran) (Los Angeles) (Marin)
,
Median -0.300 1.200 0.000 0.927 0.261 -2.993
(Monterey) (Butte) (San Mateo) (Napa) (Humboldt) (Fresno)
Low -0.007 0.566 0.000 0.220 0.003 -1.073
(Inyo) (Marin) (Humboldt) (Inyo) (Alpine) (Modoc)
,
Average -2.149 1.312 0.235 1.532 1.103 -3.414
a Manufacturing Firms per Square Mile of Land Area, underlying coefficient carries a p-
value of .037
b County Unemployment Rate, underlying coefficient carries a p-value of .077
c Existing number of prisons in the County, underlying coefficient carries a p-value of .025
d Road Miles per Square Mile of Land Area, underlying coefficient carries a p-value of .039
e Total County Population in 1000’s, underlying coefficient carries a p-value of .022
f Percent of County Population with a Bachelor’s Degree or Higher, underlying coefficient
carries a p-value of .074
While the elasticities provide information on how changes in attributes will
affect the likelihood of a county being chosen for prison construction, it is of
interest to examine the relative position of each county in the location decision.
Using the estimated model, we calculate the probabilities of being selected to
house a facility for each county.  Table 5 reports the results by likelihood.  The
county that has the greatest chance of being selected for prison construction is
Kern County with a probability of 14.57 percent.  Conversely, Orange County is
the jurisdiction that is least likely to be chosen for a new facility.  These
distinctions primarily originate from the relative economic positions of the two
counties.  Out of the 58 counties, Kern County has the 35th highest median
income ($20,690) and the 9th highest unemployment level (14.7 percent).  For
Orange County, residents have the 14th highest median income ($24,766) and
face the 3rd lowest unemployment rate (5.7 percent).  Location decisions during
our sample period are consistent with the rankings of these two counties, with
the legislature choosing to locate two facilities in Kern County while passing
over Orange county for any prison construction.
TABLE 5. RANKING OF CALIFORNIA COUNTIES ACCORDING TO THEIR PROBABILITY OF
HOUSING A NEW PRISON FACILITY*
Listing by Likelihood
County, Probability County, Probability
Kern (3)a 0.1457 San LuisObispo 0.0045
Imperial (2) 0.0808 Trinity 0.0043
Riverside (2) 0.07740 Plumas 0.0036
San Joaquin (1) 0.0732 Shasta 0.0035
Kings (3) 0.0641 Mariposa 0.0034
Yuba 0.0486 Mendocino 0.0033
Del Norte (1) 0.0476 Modoc 0.0030
San Diego (1) 0.0469 Humboldt 0.0027
Los Angeles (1) 0.0438 Ventura 0.0024
Tulare 0.0262 El Dorado 0.0020
Merced 0.0261 Nevada 0.0015
Stanislaus 0.0250 Placer 0.0012
Tuolumne 0.0241 Mono 0.0009
San Bernardino 0.0226 Inyo 0.0008
Madera (2) 0.0199 Butte 0.0007
Lake 0.0197 Santa Barbara 0.0007
Fresno (1) 0.0195 Sonoma 0.0005
Sutter 0.0194 Alpine 0.0004
San Benito 0.0174 Contra Costa 0.0003
Colusa 0.0170 Napa 0.0003
Solano (1) 0.0158 Yolo 0.0002
Sacramento (1) 0.0136 San Francisco 0.0002
Calaveras 0.0113 Santa Cruz 0.0001
Monterey (1) 0.0110 Marin 0.0000
Amador (1) 0.0108 Santa Clara 0.0000
Sierra 0.0075 Alameda 0.0000
Lassen (1) 0.0067 San Mateo 0.0000
Glenn 0.0064 Orange 0.0000
Tehama 0.0047
Siskiyou 0.0045 TOTAL 1.0000
*numbers in parentheses show the prisons located in that county during the sample period.
a Kern County was recently chosen to host the next state prison; construction is set to begin
in 2001.
Additional findings from the rankings are noteworthy.  The five most likely
candidates for a new facility currently have at least one prison within its borders
with Kings and Kern each housing three.  Considering counties without current
facilities, Yuba County has the greatest chance of being selected to house a
prison with a probability of 4.86 percent (6th overall).  Lassen County has the
lowest likelihood out of those counties that already house a facility (27th
overall). And a few cases indicate that factors other than economic conditions,
such as population, education and infrastructure, played a role in the rankings.
For example, even though the residents of Butte are ranked 45th (out of 58) in
median income and face the 27th highest unemployment rate, there are 44
counties more likely to be selected over Butte County.  Moreover, an active and
diverse economy did not prohibit San Diego and Los Angeles Counties from
showing up as the 8th and 9th most likely candidates for a new prison facility.
Concluding Remarks
The location of inferior public facilities is often a heated process. Potential
host communities often protest the arrival of undesirable public facilities such as
hazardous waste and correctional facilities. This, however, is not always the
case. If the chants of ‘not in my backyard’ are heard, the demonstrator’s
backyard is likely within a prosperous neighborhood. Residents of an
economically lagging community may not stand so fervently against the
additional economic activity provided by some inferior facilities.  Unable to
attract private commerce, these unfortunate neighborhoods may be willing to
accept the opportunities discarded as unpleasant by more prosperous
communities.  In essence, the location of inferior public good facilities can be a
source of economic development.  But do state policymakers consider, directly
or indirectly, the heterogeneous economic conditions of potential host
communities when delegating inferior facilities?  Results herein indicate the
answer is yes.
Using an approach firmly grounded in the firm location literature, we collect
data on one of the largest inferior public works projects in history to examine the
location decisions of such facilities.  Given that inferior public facilities are
generally provided in small numbers, California’s immense prison construction
program provides a unique opportunity to undertake a rigorous conditional
analysis of the location decision of an inferior public good.  We find that
depressed counties are significantly more likely to be chosen to house a
correctional facility.  The levels of employment, education and existing firms
are all significant and inversely related to the probability of a prison being
located in a community.  Further, results suggest that existing infrastructure and
agglomeration economies increase the likelihood of a community to house new
prison facilities.  The presence of agglomeration effects within the prison
industry was especially evident.
We then provide estimated county-specific probabilities of a correctional
facility being housed within the county’s borders.  Results follow the inference
that prisons are generally regulated to economic lagging communities.  Orange
County has the lowest chance of being chosen for new prison construction while
Kern County is most likely to house a facility.  The estimates follow past
location decisions and appear to correspond to future plans for the state’s newest
facility.  The California legislature recently authorized the building of the first
correctional facility since 1993, and according to the CDC, the location is set for
Kern County with construction commencing in 2001.
NOTES
1. We use the categorical term inferior (akin to income inferior goods), as opposed to
normative terms such as undesirable, due to the observation that lagging communities
with low incomes may actually desire a public facility deemed undesirable by
prosperous communities because expected economic benefits outweigh the negative
externalities.  Many private operations also fall into this category, such as cement
plants, mining, and other pollution intensive utilities.
2. Much attention has been paid to policies that site facilities that generate negative
externalities that dominate any potential benefits (e.g., hazardous waste facilities) –
specifically making the facility desirable by redistributing the overall increase in
welfare to provide monetary compensation to the host community.  See Hamilton and
Viscusi (1999), Frey et al (1996), Kunreuther and Easterling (1996), and O’Sullivan
(1993).  Herein we examine a previously overlooked issue, the siting of prison
facilities that can receive strong support within lagging communities because of the
positive net benefits arising from economic development.
3. See Martin (2000) for a comprehensive review of the criminology/sociology literature
on this issue.
4. Remarkably, the more than 114,000 new beds still fall short of current needs.  In fact,
the state leads the nation in prison overcrowding and the CDC estimates it will run
out of room by 2002.
5. This raises an issue of whether facilities with different types of inmates will follow
different location patterns.  The state prisons in California generally have multiple
security levels, as opposed to differentiating between high and low security prisons.
In fact, many of the facilities in our sample actually used the same design to reduce
costs.  The one significant difference in prison type is gender.  Given that only 3 of
22 prisons in our sample are women’s facilities, it is not possible to empirically
examine whether gender influences location patterns.  Intuitively, there is no reason
to believe gender influences siting decisions beyond the margin.
6. Indeed, results are similar when we employed different time periods.
7. The last facility within this expansion period was authorized in 1993.  The remaining
years of the decade experienced no new prison construction.
8. See McFadden (1984) for a comprehensive review of the various uses of this discrete
choice construct.  In a recent study, Alberini and Bartholomew (1999) provide an
interesting application of this technique in estimating the determinants of hazardous
waste disposal across potential waste management facilities.
9. Noting the significant regional prejudice in prison location patterns, the weakness of
our regional dummies provides some encouragment for the specified model’s ability
to capture prison location patterns.
10. While income was problematic with the unemployment rate (-0.78 correlation) and
education  (0.80 correlation),  poverty  rate  carried  a high correlation with income
(-0.86), and a relatively  low correlation  with unemployment  (0.42)  and education
(-0.45).
11. We note that sensitivity tests indicate the general finding is robust across alternative
measures of county economic conditions.
12. Results were consistent when substituting in the county’s population density.
13. In one case, the new facility was actually constructed adjacent to an existing prison
(Tehachapi, Kern County).  And indicating possible gender-specific agglomeration
effects, two of the three women’s facilities in our sample are located in the City of
Chowchilla, Madera County.
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